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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS
N. Y. CONST. art. I, § 8:
Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and
no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech
or of the press.
U.S. CONST. amend. I:
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press ....
COURT OF APPEALS
Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski 37
3
(decided Jan. 15, 1991)
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the New
York Court of Appeals reconsidered its previous decision in
Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski.374 The United States Supreme
Court had granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded
Immuno for further consideration in light of its recent decision in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 375 The New York Court of
Appeals adhered to its determination and reaffirmed its previous
holding that Dr. Moor-Jankowski's motion for summary
judgment was properly granted because Immuno AG. failed to
show that factual assertions within the letter were false.37 6 The
court concluded that the remainder of the statements were
373. 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991).
374. 74 N.Y.2d 548, 549 N.E.2d 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1989), vacated
and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 3266 (1990), on remand, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567
N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991).
375. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
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opinions that were entitled to protection under article I, section 8
of the New York State Constitution.
377
The libel action arose out of the publication of a letter by the
editor in the Journal of Medical Primatology (Journal). The de-
fendant, the editor, published the letter prefaced by an editorial
note. The subject of the letter was a critical evaluation of a deci-
sion by the plaintiff, Immuno AG., a multi-national manufacturer
of biologic products, to establish a facility in Sierra Leone, West
Africa. The author of the letter, Dr. Shirley McGreal, was the
chairwoman of the International Primate Protection League
(IPPL), an organization recognized "for its vigorous advocacy on
behalf of primates, particularly those used for biomedical re-
search." ' 378 The defendant, the co-founder and editor of the
Journal, is a professor of medical research at New York
University School of Medicine and director of the Laboratory for
Experimental Medicine and Surgery in Primates at New York
University Medical Center. 379
Immuno AG. commenced a libel action against Dr. Moor-
Jankowski and seven other defendants. The other seven defen-
dants had previously settled with the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court of New York County denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment as to the defamation claim. The supreme
court's ruling was reversed by the appellate division, whose rul-
ing was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. Upon grant
of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, the decision of
the New York Court of Appeals was vacated and the case was re-
manded for further consideration in light of Milkovich.
380
The court of appeals began its analysis with the federal consti-
tutional claim, focusing on the Milkovich decision. In Milkovich,
the United States Supreme Court rejected the "misperception -
traceable to the dictum in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.381 that...
377. Id. at 255-56, 567 N.E.2d at 1281-82, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917-18; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
378. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 240, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
908.
379. Id.
380. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
381. 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
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there is a 'wholesale defamation exemption"' for any statements
labeled as opinion. 382  The "key inquiry" in determining
whether speech is actionable or protected opinion is "whether
[the] challenged expression, however labeled by defendant,
would reasonably appear to state or imply assertions of objective
fact." 383 This is not a literal evaluation, rather a court should
"consider the impression created by the words used as well as the
general tenor of the expression, from the point of view of the
reasonable person." 384 The majority recognized protection for
statements that can not reasonably be interpreted as stating actual
facts about an individual, thus ensuring "that public debate will
not suffer for lack of 'imaginative expression' or the 'rhetorical
hyperbole' which has traditionally added much to the discourse of
our Nation." 385
The court of appeals examined the Milkovich "type of speech"
test which separates actionable fact from protected opinion. It
found that the majority in Milkovich "resolved 'type of speech'
considerations in two sentences: 'This is not the sort of loose,
figurative or hyperbolic language which would negate the im-
pression that the writer was seriously maintaining petitioner
committed the crime of perjury. Nor does the general tenor of the
article negate this impression.' "386
The court of appeals noted that the majority's analysis failed to
address the conjectural language of the article at issue, or the
place where the article appeared, namely the sports page. Both
considerations were the subject of primary occupation by the
Ohio Supreme Court and the dissent in Milkovich. 387 Indeed, it
382. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 242, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
909 (quoting Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705). The court noted that Milkovich
did not change the federal standard but, rather, clarified it. See id. at 242-43,
567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
383. Id. at 243, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
384. Id. at 243, 567 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909-10.
385. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706 (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46 (1988)).
386. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 244, 567 N.E.2d at 1274-75, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
910-11 (quoting Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707).
387. Id. at 244-45, 567 N.E.2d at 1275, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 911 (citing
Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2710-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
[Vol 8898
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was this focus on the above two considerations that persuaded the
dissent, as it had the Ohio Supreme Court, that "no reasonable
reader would have regarded the challenged assertions, in their
context, as factual." 388 Thus, the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that the majority in Milkovich struck the following
balance between "First Amendment protection for media
defendants and protection for individual reputation: [E]xcept for
special situations of loose, figurative, hyperbolic language,
statements that contain or imply assertions of provably false fact
will likely be actionable." 389
Applying the Milkovich standard to this case, the New York
Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiff failed to meet its
burden of showing the falsity of the two assertions of fact
discerned by the court. The court vehemently noted that "we did
not, and do not, hold that the assertions of verifiable fact...
were overridden . . by the broader context and .
automatically . . protected as opinion." ' 390 It further asserted
that "a libel plaintiff has the burden of showing the falsity of
factual assertions." ' 391 Relying on the factual review, conducted
by the appellate division, the court found that what the plaintiff
characterized as the "core libel" contained one express and one
implied fact. The express fact was the assertion that in the
statement "there is no scientific method for determining if a
chimpanzee exposed to the non-A, non-B virus is not a carrier of
the disease." 392 The implied fact was the assertion "that plaintiff
will release possible carrier-chimpanzees who may endanger the
wild population."' 393 The court found that both assertions were
verifiable. Thus, they are actionable facts, if proved false.
However, the court found that although the "core premise" could
be actionable, the plaintiff nonetheless failed to show its falsity.
The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant under
the First Amendment.
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The court of appeals also resolved the case independently,
based on state law analysis, and determined that the motion for
summary judgment also was properly granted under state law.
The court found bases under both "interpretive" and "non-inter-
pretive" analyses to decide the case on independent state
grounds.
As to the "interpretive" 394 analysis, the court relied on the
"expansive language of [the] State Constitutional guarantee...
[and] its formulation and adoption prior to the Supreme Court's
application of the First Amendment to the States . . . . ,395 The
court noted that the text of the state provision, that "[e]very citi-
zen may freely speak, write and publish . .. sentiments in all
subjects," reflects the "choice of the New York State
Constitutional Convention not to follow the language of the First
Amendment[,] . ..but . .. to set forth our basic democratic
ideal of liberty of the press in strong affirmative terms.,, 396 The
court further noted that its determination was based on the long
tradition of common law in the state.
As to the "non-interpretive ' 397 analysis, the court noted the
long tradition of New York State as a "cultural center for the
Nation," 398 which has "long provided a hospitable climate for
the free exchange of ideas." 399
State law may expand and broaden the federal minimum re-
quired by the Federal Constitution, and courts may decide cases
on independent state grounds. The court began its state law
analysis by referring to the current state standard for evaluating
defamation actions. The current state standard requires
"published articles [to be read] in context to test their effect on
394. Interpretive analysis refers to text and history. Id. at 249, 567 N.E.2d
at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
395. Id. at 248, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (citations
omitted).
396. Id. at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (citing Morris
D. Forkosch, Freedom of the Press: Crowell's Case, 33 FORDHAM L. REV.
415 (1965)).
397. Non-interpretive analysis includes an examination of tradition and
policy. Id. at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
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the average reader, not to isolate particular phrases but to
consider the publication as a whole."'' 4 The court then reaf-
firmed this standard which was drawn from state common law
and articulated in Steinhilber v. Alphonse.401 Under Steinhilber,
the court must analyze "the content of the whole communication,
its tone and apparent purpose. "402 In the court's view, this stan-
dard is clear and familiar and "properly balances the interests in-
volved." 40 3 The court expressly declared: "[MVe believe that an
analysis that begins by looking at the content of the whole com-
munication, its tone and apparent purpose better balances the val-
ues at stake than an analysis that first examines the challenged
statements for express and implied factual assertions, and finds
them actionable unless couched in loose, figurative or hyperbolic
language in charged circumstances. "404
Applying the Steinhilber standard, the court analyzed the case
in much the same way as the Milkovich dissent construed the
standard adopted by the Milkovich majority. In both cases, the
broader social setting was taken into consideration. Here, from
the point of view of the broader social setting, the court declared
that "'the common expectation of a letter to the editor is not that
it will serve as a vehicle for the rigorous and comprehensive
presentation of factual matter but as one principally for the
expression of individual opinion. "' 405 The court also noted that it
is generally understood that readers may give the view of an
author of a letter to the editor any weight the reader chooses. The
court found letters to the editor important because they provide a
forum "for persons or groups with views on a subject of public
400. Id. at 250, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
401. 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1986).
402. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 250, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
914.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 254, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (citation
omitted).
405. Id. at 253, 567 N.E.2d at 1280, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 916 (quoting
Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 145 A.D.2d 114, 129, 537 N.Y.S.2d 129,
138 (1st Dep't 1989), aft'd, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 549 N.E.2d 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d
938, vacated and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 3266 (1990), 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567
N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991)).
1992] 901
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interest to reach and persuade the broader community." '40 6 The
court found that "[tihe public forum function of letters to the edi-
tor is closely related in spirit to the 'marketplace of ideas' and
oversight and informational values that compelled recognition of
the privileges of fair comment, fair report and the immunity ac-
corded expression of opinion."' 40 7 A publication that provides
such a forum helps foster the premises of democratic govern-
ment. The court then moved from the broader social context of
letters to the editor in general to the immediate context of this
letter and the common expectation of the readers of a scientific
journal such as Moor-Jankowski's. It found that the journal had a
highly specialized group of readers and that the average reader of
this journal is likely to have "'a well-developed understanding of
the issues facing bio-medical researchers using primates as
research subjects.' "408 Thus, the court concluded that "it would
be plain to the reasonable reader of this scientific publication that
McGreal was voicing no more than a highly partisan point of
view" when the letter is viewed in its context. 40 9
Judge Simons, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the
majority's decision to decide this case on independent state
grounds. Judge Simons first stated that "the majority has
rendered an interpretation of Milkovich which is narrower than
necessary to resolve the matter before us and one which appears,
from statements in the Milkovich opinions, to be far more
constricted than the Supreme Court intended. ' ' 410 The more
important concern, according to Judge Simons, was that the
majority unnecessarily relied on independent state law and, thus,
insulated the analysis from review by the Supreme Court and
precluded a determination by the Court as to whether the New
York Court of Appeals correctly interpreted Milkovich.
According to Judge Simons, the majority's unnecessary re-
406. Id. at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 253, 567 N.E.2d at 1280, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 916 (quoting
Immuno, 145 A.D.2d at 129, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 138).
409. Id.
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liance on state law violated established rules of judicial restraint.
In this case, context was not controlling. The "plaintiff's claims
fail[ed] regardless of the 'circumstances' or 'context' . -411
The court found that the assertions of fact were not proven to be
false by the plaintiff. That was the extent of the federal
constitutional analysis. Yet, "the majority proceed[ed] to exam-
ine the context of the statements under the State Constitution be-
cause a different conclusion could conceivably emerge under
Milkovich." 412
Judge Simons concluded that "[t]he inevitable consequence of
dual reliance is that the Supreme Court, charged with ultimate
authority in the area, loses a measure of control over the law it
has created." 413 The Supreme Court will not review the matter
because it no longer has control over the litigation. The result,
according to Judge Simons, "of reaching both state and federal
grounds is that the discussion of Federal law, under Supreme
Court precedent, is dictum because we have relied on indepen-
dent State grounds. Conversely, the discussion of State grounds is
largely dictum because context is not controlling in this case." 414
Judge Titone, joined by Judges Simons and Hancock, was
concerned regarding "the propriety and wisdom of deciding this
appeal on alternative State and Federal constitutional
analyses." 415 However, Judge Titone maintained that the
controlling legal principles should be derived from state law
rather than federal law.
Judge Titone reasoned that Milkovich merely established the
minimum standard below which the state law may not fall.
However, Judge Titone stated that "[tihere is nothing in
Milkovich or any of the related cases that impairs the States'
411. Id. at 260, 567 N.E.2d at 1284, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 920 (Simons, J.,
concurring).
412. Id. (Simons, J., concurring).
413. Id. at 262, 567 N.E.2d at 1285, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 921 (Simons, J.,
concurring).
414. Id. at 263, 567 N.E.2d at 1286, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Simons, J.,
concurring).
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power to impose additional limitations, based on either their own
Constitutions or the traditions underlying their previously
established common-law doctrines." ' 416 Judge Titone proposed
that the issues in this case should have been decided solely based
on New York State law, specifically the common law doctrine of
"fair comment."
417
Judge Titone justified the focus on the common law principle
of "fair comment" on the grounds that "courts should avoid
passing upon constitutional questions when the case can be
disposed of in another way."418 Indeed, according to Judge
Titone, the common law principle of "fair comment" demands
the same standard for evaluation of actionable facts as does the
constitutional standard. "[F]air comment" demands a
consideration of "the context, tone and character of a statement
challenged as defamatory when determining whether it constitutes
a privileged 'fair comment' or an actionable assertion of
fact."' 419 Thus, Judge Titone agreed with the majority's
analytical framework with regard to the "context" standard.
The New York Court of Appeals' reaffirmation of its clear and
familiar standard of looking to the context of a statement when
applying the opinion exemption could have national significance
in the wake of Milkovich. Under Milkovich, the United States
Supreme Court declared that there was no wholesale exemption
for defamatory statements couched as opinion and that a state-
ment could be actionable if it appeared to state or imply an asser-
tion of fact, regardless of its context. 420 Under the federal
standard, the letter to the editor in Immuno could have been
actionable had the implied facts been proven false because they
were "restrained, [and] the statements [were] seriously
416. Id. at 264, 567 N.E.2d at 1287, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
417. Id. at 265, 567 N.E.2d at 1288, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
418. Id. at 267, 567 N.E.2d at 1289, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 925 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
419. Id. at 266, 567 N.E.2d at 1288, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
420. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
[Vol 8904
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maintained, and they [had] an apparent basis in fact." ' 421
Both standards make clear what most courts have nonetheless
assumed, that merely because a statement is characterized as
opinion does not render it as such. The difference is that the
Supreme Court looks only to see if the language is "loose,
figurative or hyperbolic" in order to determine if the writer was
in fact, not seriously trying to convey fact. The New York Court
of Appeals looks not only to the language of the statement, but
also to the context of the publication as a whole in order to
determine if the reader would construe the statements as factual
assertions. The New York Court of Appeals declared that the
"narrow exemption" in Milkovich means that "insufficient
protection may be accorded to central values protected by the law
of this State." 422 The court expressly noted the history and
tradition of providing broader protection of freedom of
expression in this state than is provided by the federal courts.
Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis423
(decided May 7, 1991)
The plaintiff, Children of Bedford, Inc., a nonprofit
organization, challenged the constitutionality of New York
Executive Law, section 632-a.424 The organization, which was
receiving royalties from Jean Harris' book, Stranger in Two
Worlds, asserted that: 1) the book was not subject to the statute;
2) the statute violated federal 425 and state426 guarantees of free
speech; and 3) the proceedings conducted by the crime victims
421. Id. at 246, 567 N.E.2d at 1276, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
422. Id. at 250, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
423. 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453, overruled in
part, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
424. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992). This
statute, commonly known as the "Son of Sam" law, was enacted in order to
give crime victims financial assistance from the monetary benefits convicted
criminals receive for their written works. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at
719, 573 N.E.2d at 543, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
425. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
426. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1992] 905
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board violated federal due process427 guarantees. The New York
Court of Appeals held "that the book [was] subject to the statute
and that the proceedings did not violate the [plaintiffs] due
process rights." 428 The court found that the statute serves a
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to accomplish
that purpose.429 Hence, the statute was not violative of free
speech under either the Federal or New York State Constitution.
However, on December 10, 1991, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Member of the New York State Crime Victims Board, the United
States Supreme Court declared New York Executive Law section
632-a, the "Son of Sam" law, unconstitutional. 430 The Supreme
Court held that while the statute serves the state's compelling
state interest in compensating victims from the fruits of the
crime, the statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve this
interest. 431
As stated above, the plaintiffs were a nonprofit organization
who were assigned the royalties from the publication of a book
entitled Stranger in Two Worlds. The book was written by Jean
Harris after her conviction and imprisonment in the Bedford Hills
Correctional Facility. Harris was convicted of the second degree
murder of Dr. Herman Tarnower. Stranger in Two Worlds is a
compilation of Harris' experience at the prison's children's center
with imprisoned mothers who were trying to maintain bonds with
their children. It is also the story of her life, including her life
with Tarnower, his murder, and her prison experiences. Before
publication, the publisher submitted a copy of its contract with
Harris and a copy of the book to the Crime Victims (Board). 432
The Board has the express duty of determining whether a book is
427. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
428. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 718-19, 573 N.E.2d at 543, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 455.
429. Id. at 729, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
430. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims
Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
431. Id. at 509.
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subject to Executive Law section 632-a. 433 Executive Law
section 632-a, provides:
[Those] contracting with any person or the representative or as-
signee of any person accused or convicted of a crime in [New
York], with respect to the reenactment of such crime . . or
from the expression of such accused or convicted person's
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime,
shall submit a copy of [the] contract to the [Crime Victims]
[B]oard .... 434
The court in Children of Bedford stated: "If the board deter-
mines that the criminal's work comes within the statute, any
moneys owing under the contract must be paid to the Board. The
funds are deposited in escrow for the benefit of the victims or
legal representatives of the victims of the crime." 435
The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court's
determination that the book was covered by the statute. The court
found that despite the fact that only two chapters of the book
contain Harris' version of the reenactment of her crime, "these
two chapters make up the core of the work around which the
narrative of Harris's life story is structured.",436 The court stated
that "[i]ndeed, it is apparent from the preliminary negotiations
between MacMillan and Harris and from the publicity
surrounding publication that MacMillan believed the book's
commercial value rested on subject matter within the statute." 437
Addressing the plaintiffs procedural due process claim, the
court stated that due process mandates reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard. 438 Applying this standard, the court
concluded that the preliminary findings of the Crime Victims
Board were made available to the plaintiff prior to the hearings,
thereby satisfying the notice requirement of the Due Process
Clause. The plaintiffs other procedural due process claim rested
433. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992).
434. Id.
435. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 720, 573 N.E.2d at 544, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 456.
436. Id. at 722, 573 N.E.2d at 545, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
437. Id.
438. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950).
19921 907
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on the assertion that the Board acted improperly when it
functioned as both the prosecutor and judge. The court stated that
"[t]he [plaintiff] must demonstrate that because of this practice
the Board has been prejudiced by its investigation or for some
reason is disabled from hearing and deciding the matter on the
basis of the evidence." 439 On this issue, the court found that the
evidence in the case did not support the plaintiff's contention.
The court then addressed the plaintiff's free speech claim under
both the Federal and New York State Constitutions. Addressing
the free speech claim under the Federal Constitution first, the
court found that the book was protected speech under the First
Amendment. 440 In determining the standard of judicial review to
be applied to the governmental regulation of the speech, the court
first determined that the statute was a content based regulation.
The statute singles out speech on a particular subject, and then
imposes a financial burden on the speech. This is a direct burden
placed on this type of speech, and not placed on any other. The
court analogized the present case to Meyer v. Grant,441 a case in
which the United States Supreme Court concluded that a
Colorado statute was subject to strict scrutiny because it imposed
a financial burden on political speech by placing a limitation on
the number of people who could convey the political message. 442
Similarly, the New York Son of Sam law imposes an economic
disincentive for the publication of the criminal's reenactment or
depiction of the crime.
Accordingly, in order to justify the differential treatment
imposed by the statute, the state must demonstrate that the statute
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly
439. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 723-24, 573 N.E.2d at 546, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 458 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55 (1975)).
440. Id. at 724-25, 573 N.E.2d at 546-47, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 458-59 (citing
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("the
Commission of Crime(s)... are without question events of legitimate concern
to the public"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)
(defining the limited classes of speech "the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem")).
441. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
442. Id. at 422-23.
[Vol 8908
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tailored to achieve that state purpose.443 The court of appeals
found that the state has a compelling interest in ensuring that
criminals do not profit from their crimes, as well as ensuring that
victims of crimes are compensated by those who harm them. The
court found that the Son of Sam law serves the state's compelling
interest by not only providing a method for victims to obtain
compensation, but also by reflecting the community's belief that
it is unacceptable for criminals to profit from their own
wrong. 44
The court then examined whether the statute was narrowly tai-
lored to achieve this compelling state interest.445 The concern in
this part of the analysis is to ensure that the means or methods
chosen by the government are not substantially broader than nec-
essary to carry out the governmental interest. It is at this stage of
the analysis that the New York Court of Appeals and the United
States Supreme Court arrived at different conclusions.
The New York Court of Appeals found that the New York Son
of Sam law was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state
interest. 446 The court reasoned that the statute
creates a unique and identifiable resource and preserves it for the
benefit of victims directly injured by a crime to compensate them
for the damages sustained, gives them priority over the
criminal's other creditors and extends the time within which a
claim to the proceeds may be asserted by a victim. The statute
regulates only the criminal's receipt of money, not the right to
speak about the crime and it does not impose a forfeiture of all
profits - it merely delays payment (632-a[ll][c]). 447
The court noted that the statute provides an incentive for the
443. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987).
444. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 725-26, 573 N.E.2d at 547-48,
570 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60; see also Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22
N.E. 188, 190 (1889) ("No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud,
or to the advantage of his own wrong.").
445. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 728, 573 N.E.2d at 549, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 461.
446. Id. at 729, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
447. Id. at 729-30, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
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criminal to speak because the proceeds from the speech will pay
for his or her legal fees. Additionally, the statute does not impose
a limitation on others who may be interested in telling the crimi-
nal's story. Thus, the court concluded that the reach of the statute
was limited to its purpose. 448
Nearly five months after Children of Bedford, the United States
Supreme Court, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New
York State Crime Victims Board,449 reviewed the Son of Sam law
and concluded that although the statute serves the state's
compelling interest of ensuring that victims are compensated
from the proceeds of the crime, the statute is not narrowly
tailored to achieve the state's purpose. 450 The United States
Supreme Court held that the New York Son of Sam law was
significantly over inclusive. 451 Thus, it found that "the statute
[was] inconsistent with the First Amendment.", 452 Unlike the
New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found the New
York Son of Sam law encompassed a potentially large number of
works by its express language. The statute's broad definition of
"person convicted of a crime" enables the Crime Victims Board
to escrow the income of any author who admits to having
committed a crime. 453 The majority opinion, authored by Justice
O'Connor, cited several examples of the statute's broad
provision. This list included works such as the autobiography of
Malcolm X, which describes crimes committed by the civil rights
leader prior to his involvement in the movement; the Confessions
of Saint Augustine, in which the author admits to the theft of
pears from a neighboring vineyard; and a reference to a
bibliography submitted to the Court by the Association of
American Publishers, listing hundreds of works by prominent
figures whose autobiographies, if written, would be subject to the
statute.454 These authors included:
448. Id. at 730, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
449. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
450. Id. at 512.
451. Id.
452. Id.
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Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted of treason after a
dubiously conducted 1603 trial; Jesse Jackson, who was arrested
in 1963 for trespass and resisting arrest after attempting to be
served at a lunch counter in North Carolina; and Bertrand
Russel, who was jailed for seven days at the age of 89 for
participating in a sitdown protest against nuclear weapons. 455
Justice O'Connor noted that the Son of Sam law clearly
reached a wide range of speech that would not compensate the
criminals or the victims. Because the statute could include such a
wide range of speech, the majority concluded that the New York
statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's objective
of compensating crime victims from the profit of crime.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared the New York Son of
Sam law inconsistent with the First Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. 4
56
Finally, the plaintiff, Children of Bedford, Inc., had also
asserted that the New York Son of Sam law violated the free
speech provision of the New York State Constitution. The New
York Court of Appeals acknowledged that New York's free
speech clause is more expansive than its federal counterpart.
However, it appears that because the court concluded that the
New York statute satisfied the strict scrutiny required by the
Federal Constitution, the statute would meet the broader
requirement of article I, section 8 of the New York State
Constitution that requires some type of "genuinely close fit"' 45 7
between the statute and its purpose. The court stated that "this
requirement is no more burdensome than requiring that the statute




456. Id. at 512.
457. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 731, 573 N.E.2d at 551, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 463.
458. Id. at 732, 573 N.E.2d at 551, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
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